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A War on Civilians:1 
Disaster Capitalism2 and the Drug War in Mexico 
Gabrielle D. Schneck 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Within days of his inauguration in December 2006, Mexican President 
Felipe Calderón declared “war” on organized crime. In particular, Calderón 
aimed to confront the powerful cartels that control the drug trade and other 
illicit industries such as human trafficking.3 Following a highly contested 
election, Calderón entered office amid accusations of electoral fraud and 
months of mass protest.4 In a show of strength to gain political legitimacy, he 
immediately deployed over 20,000 federal troops5 under the banner of fighting 
the “war on drugs.”6 Calderón’s militarized escalation of  antinarcotics efforts 
                                                 
1 “A War on Civilians”: Mexico’s Drug War Draws Protests as Grueling Death Toll 
Grows, DEMOCRACY NOW! (May 11, 2011) (quoting Molly Molloy), available at  
http://www.democracynow.org/2011/5/11/a_war_on_civilians_mexicos_drug. 
2 The term “disaster capitalism” is a phrase coined by Naomi Klein in her New York 
Times bestselling book. See NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF 
DISASTER CAPITALISM 12 (2008). 
3 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NEITHER RIGHTS NOR SECURITY: KILLINGS, TORTURE, AND 
DISAPPEARANCES IN MEXICO’S “WAR ON DRUGS” 4 (2011), available at  
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico1111webwcover_0.pdf [hereinafter 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH].   
4 See JOHN GIBLER, TO DIE IN MEXICO: DISPATCHES FROM INSIDE THE DRUG WAR 61 
(2011) [hereinafter TO DIE IN MEXICO].  
5 See JOHN GIBLER, MEXICO UNCONQUERED: CHRONICLES OF POWER AND REVOLT 52 
(2009) [hereinafter MEXICO UNCONQUERED]; CHARLES BOWDEN, MURDER CITY: CIUDAD 
JUAREZ AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY’S NEW KILLING FIELDS 25 (2010). 
6 Some sources place the term “war on drugs” in quotation marks when referencing 
Calderón’s militarization program. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 4. 
Alternatively, at least one expert avoids the term altogether because the traditional concept of 
war, implying adversarial militaries, is the “wrong metaphor” for this conflict. HOWARD 
CAMPBELL, DRUG WAR ZONE: FRONTLINE DISPATCHES FROM THE STREETS OF EL PASO 
AND JUÁREZ 7 (Univ. of Texas Press 2009). Unlike traditional armies, cartels are both covert 
and somewhat fluid, with shifting alliances; additionally, in Mexico, they are “tightly 
interwoven” with the government, their purported enemy. See id. Here, I use the term “war 
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represents a dramatic shift in the Mexican government’s approach to the drug 
trade, a business in which it has long been involved and from which it has long 
benefitted.7 Notably, the military crackdown has not reduced the drug trade, 
nor has it eased crime-related violence in Mexico.8 Instead, the violence has 
intensified, and human rights violations have risen severely.9 As of January 
2012, the Mexican government acknowledges that 47,515 people have died in 
the drug war within the span of five years,10 and some experts contend that the 
death toll is much higher than the official numbers reflect.11 
Calderón’s war on drugs has had a profound and devastating impact on 
Mexico, generating a climate of fear and violence that has repercussions on 
nearly all levels of Mexican society.12 This article intends to critically examine 
the myths used to justify the militarized approach of Mexico’s current 
antinarcotic efforts by looking at the interests of its US and Mexican 
supporters. My goal is to engage in a broad analysis of the drug war in the 
context of other political issues such as free trade, the illicit drug industry’s 
corrupting influence on law enforcement, immigration, and anti-neoliberal 
social movements in Mexico in a way that is accessible to those with limited 
                                                                                                       
on drugs” to reference antidrug policies of both the Mexican and US governments, but for 
the sake of simplicity and consistency, I do not place the term in quotation marks hereinafter. 
I use the term “drug war,” also without quotation marks hereinafter, to refer generally to 
drug-related violence. I intend this latter term to encompass two overlapping sources of 
violence: (1) the ongoing contest for control of the drug business among cartels, which the 
state also participates in, and (2) the militarized law-enforcement operations of the war on 
drugs fought by the Mexican security forces as part of the state’s antinarcotics policy. See TO 
DIE IN MEXICO, supra note 4, at 26. 
7 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 4. See also TO DIE IN MEXICO, supra note 
4, at 25–29. 
8 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 5. 
9 Id. 
10 See Mexican Drug Trafficking (Mexico’s Drug War), N.Y. TIMES,  
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/mexico/drug_traffic
king/index.html (last updated Jan. 19, 2012). 
11 Mexico Says Drug War Death Toll Has Topped 47,000, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Jan. 12, 
2012), http://www.democracynow.org/2012/1/12/headlines (“The Mexican census agency 
has identified 67,000 homicides from 2007 through 2010, nearly double the government’s 
count of drug-related deaths for that period.”). 
12 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 4–5. 
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exposure to such issues. In doing so, my hope is to break some of the silence 
surrounding Mexico’s drug war within the parameters of US political and legal 
discourse and to contribute to the advancement of meaningful social change. 
Broadly, the militarization of Mexico since 2006 under the umbrella of the 
US-led war on drugs is best understood as a product of neoliberalism,13 and, as 
such, its operations can be best understood through a critique of neoliberal 
socio-economic and security programs. I contend that the increasing 
militarization of Mexico’s counternarcotics efforts represents a new theater of 
the disaster capitalism complex, a term coined by award-winning journalist 
and author Naomi Klein in her book The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster 
Capitalism.14 As such, the war on drugs approach is best understood by 
analyzing the connections between free-market trade policies, the privatization 
of the security industry, and the potential for state and economic elite actors to 
capitalize on disaster-induced collective trauma. 
Section I begins by reviewing the current landscape of President Calderón’s 
war on drugs, including the justifications for the war offered by the Mexican 
and US governments, the parameters of US drug aid, and some of the main 
critiques of the war. Section II provides a broad context for analyzing 
neoliberalism by looking at its characteristic economic and security programs 
and connecting them with the United States’ domestic war on drugs and 
immigration enforcement policies. Section III discusses neoliberalism in 
Mexico, focusing on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and 
resistance within Mexico to free-market economic policies. Finally, Section IV 
draws connections between the militarization of Mexico’s antinarcotics efforts, 
the collective trauma that has been produced by the war, and the economic 
elite interests that benefit from protecting neoliberal policies in Mexico. 
                                                 
13 Neoliberalism refers to the set of trends and ideas that have come to dominate political 
discourse and practice in various areas, and it is discussed in more detail below. See LISA 
DUGGAN, THE TWILIGHT OF EQUALITY?: NEOLIBERALISM, CULTURAL POLITICS, AND THE 
ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY xi–xii (2003). 
14 See KLEIN, supra note 2, at 12. 
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II. BACKGROUND: THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE 
The current Mexican government’s antinarcotic efforts have focused on 
utilizing the military to wage an assault on cartels.15 Each year, Calderón’s 
administration has steadily increased the deployment of Mexican troops, from 
20,000 to 30,000 initially, and eventually to 50,000.16 Mexico has seen serious 
increases in human rights violations and fatalities related to the war on drugs 
committed by both security forces and organized crime.17 By the end of 2007, 
Calderón’s first year in office, 2,826 people had been killed in drug-related 
violence,18 nearly the same number that died during the previous 
administration’s entire six years in office.19 In 2008, that number almost 
doubled: between 5,000 and 6,000 people were killed in the violence.20 In 
2010, the death toll exploded to 15,273 in just one year.21 By November 2011, 
the total number of fatalities since Calderón had taken office nearly five years 
prior hovered around 45,000.22 
In addition to the sheer number of deaths, patterns of egregious human 
rights abuses have emerged in Mexico, committed by both the cartels and 
Mexican law enforcement, particularly the military. Brutality has become a 
hallmark of drug-related violence, and the systematic use of torture and forced 
disappearances has surfaced.23 The Mexican security forces commonly use 
beatings, asphyxiation with plastic bags, electric shocks, sexual torture, death 
threats, and mock executions; these tactics are believed to be aimed at eliciting 
information about organized crime.24 The prevalence of disappearances has 
                                                 
15 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 4. 
16 See id.; BOWDEN, supra note 6, at 25. 
17 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 4–6. 
18 Id. at 4. 
19 See MEXICO UNCONQUERED, supra note 5, at 52. Three thousand people died in drug-
related violence during the presidency of Vicente Fox from 2000 to 2006. Id. 
20 See BOWDEN, supra note 5, at 17. 
21 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 4. 
22 Id. 
23 See id. at 5. 
24 See id. at 5–6. 
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increased as well, and evidence suggests that state security forces are often 
involved in these events, even when officials blame organized crime for the 
acts.25 The cartels, on the other hand, use the same tactics of torture, forced 
disappearances, and executions in their struggle to control the channels of the 
drug trade. The violence often targets competing cartels, but it also victimizes 
the family members of those touched by the drug business on various levels, 
including small business owners who refuse to pay extortion fees, young 
people who have taken low-level jobs in the drug business, as well as 
journalists, politicians, mayors, and other members of the public.26 The 
military escalation under Calderón has not halted the wheels of the drug 
economy. Instead, the escalation marks the moment when “the killing began to 
spiral to previously unimagined levels.”27 
Shortly after entering office, President Calderón began talks with the United 
States about funding the increased militarization of Mexico’s drug war. These 
talks produced the Mérida Initiative,28 committing USD $1.5 billion to Mexico 
and Central America between 2008 and 2010,29 with $1.3 billion going to 
                                                 
25 See id. at 5–6, 125. 
26 See generally EL SICARIO: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A MEXICAN ASSASSIN 18–20, 26, 
116 (Molly Molloy & Charles Bowden eds., Molly Molloy trans., 2011) [hereinafter EL 
SICARIO]. EL SICARIO is the story of a former paid assassin from Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, 
who worked in the drug industry for both the cartels and law enforcement, often at the same 
time. Id. at 73–74. His account details the use of torture and murder by both the cartels and 
the state, the corruption of the Mexican government, and the enormous profits that continue 
to be made by both the cartels and the state through the drug trade. See, e.g., id. at 11–12, 
80–81, 125–26. He fled from this life in 2007. Id. at 17. He lives in the United States in self-
exile, and his identity remains anonymous. See id. at xii, 4. The word “sicario,” in this 
context, refers generally to the individuals and groups hired by Mexican cartels as enforcers. 
COLLEEN W. COOK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34215, MEXICO’S DRUG CARTELS 6 
(2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf. 
27 BOWDEN, supra note 5, at 25. 
28 The agreement was initially known as Plan Mexico, but the name was probably changed 
due to its parallels with Plan Colombia, which is briefly discussed later. See Daniela Morales 
& Peter Watt, Narcotrafficking in Mexico: Neoliberalism and a Militarized State, UPSIDE 
DOWN WORLD (Sept. 17, 2010, 12:30 PM), http://upsidedownworld.org/main/mexico-
archives-79/2696-narcotrafficking-in-mexico-neoliberalism-and-a-militarized-state.  
29 Fact Sheet: The Mérida Initiative/Plan Mexico, WITNESS FOR PEACE,  
http://www.witnessforpeace.org/downloads/Witness%20for%20Peace%20Fact%20Sheet_M
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Mexico.30 Originally negotiated by the Bush administration, President Obama 
has continued to support the militarization of Mexico under the program. In 
2010, he requested that Congress allocate $450 million to purchase more 
equipment for the Mexican authorities.31 By January 2011, US aid to Mexico 
and Central America aimed at fighting the drug industry totaled $1.7 billion.32 
In August 2011, the State Department announced that the Mérida Initiative will 
continue with a focus on Mexico’s northern states,33 and the Obama 
administration has requested $290 million in funding for 2012.34 The aid has 
been directed at providing various types of support for the Mexican security 
forces, including inspection and surveillance equipment, helicopters, military 
training, and technology.35 The hefty amounts of continuing aid directed at this 
effort suggests that US policy makers have identified a clear interest in 
furthering the militarization of Mexico’s war on drugs; it also means that the 
brutal escalation of violence in recent years has been funded, at least in part, by 
US taxpayers. 
President Calderón acknowledges that drug trafficking cannot be resolved 
solely be confronting the cartels. He has publicly recognized that the demand 
                                                                                                       
erida%20Initiative_2011.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). Mexico is receiving the bulk of the 
$1.5 billion in aid. See Phillip Smith, Plan Merida Focus to Shift to Border Region, 
STOPTHEDRUGWAR.ORG (Aug. 17, 2011, 7:38 PM),  
http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/2011/aug/17/plan_merida_focus_shift_border_r. 
30 Gian Carlo Delgado-Ramos & Silvina María Romano, Political-Economic Factors in U.S. 
Foreign Policy: The Colombia Plan, the Mérida Initiative, and the Obama Administration, 
178 LATIN AM. PERSP. 93, 93 n.6 (2011). Around $1.3 billion was contributed to Mexico 
through the plan; specifically, $400 million for 2008, $720 million for 2009, and $210 
million for early 2010. Id. 
31 See Blake Hounshell, Foreign Policy: The New Drug War We’ve Already Met, NPR (Mar. 
15, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124704949. 
32 See Hillary Clinton Backs Mexico Drug War, BBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2011, 11:08 PM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12264674. 
33 Diana Washington Valdez, Official: Next Phase of Merida Initiative to Focus on Northern 
Mexico, EL PASO TIMES (Aug. 16, 2011, 3:38 PM),  
http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/ci_18693357?source=pkg. 
34 See Fact Sheet: The Mérida Initiative/Plan Mexico, supra note 29. 
35 See Michelle Malkin, National Review: Slaughter On The Southern Border, NPR (Mar. 
17, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124760306. 
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for drugs within the United States has made the industry into a profitable 
business, and that the flow of assault rifles from the United States into the 
hands of Mexico’s cartels has contributed to the cartels’ power. Yet, he asserts 
that his government has “no alternative” but to meet the cartels with military 
force.36 He acknowledges that the rising death toll is “painful,” but dismisses 
the dead as criminals,37 repeatedly assuring his country that 90 percent of the 
dead are involved with the drug trade.38 However, 95 percent39 of the murders 
are never investigated, suggesting that Calderón has no factual basis for this 
assertion and revealing his administration’s bias against victims.40 Notably, 
many whose lives have been touched by the violence disagree that the 
casualties should be dismissed or disregarded in this way.41 
On many levels, drug trafficking is a business, and one that is quite 
lucrative. Profits from the industry are estimated to be between $30 billion and 
$60 billion per year, which means that drug money is competitive with oil as 
the greatest source of revenue for Mexico.42 The Mexican government, 
particularly its army and police, has facilitated the drug trade for decades and 
has participated in it extensively.43 Given the enormous profits that the 
Mexican state stands to make in the drug business, the counternarcotics efforts 
may not represent a sincere effort to quash the drug industry. In this sense, at 
least one critic notes that this war is not against drugs, but rather one “for 
drugs, for the enormous money to be made in drugs” by all the players who 
can benefit from a cut of the profits, including elected officials, the police, and 
the military.44 
                                                 
36 Stephen Sackur, ‘No Alternative’ to Mexico’s Drug War - Says Calderon, BBC NEWS 
(Oct. 27, 2010, 10:01 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/hardtalk/9130155.stm. 
37 See id. 
38 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 10. 
39  TO DIE IN MEXICO, supra note 4, at 40. 
40 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 3, at 11. 
41 See id. 
42 TO DIE IN MEXICO, supra note 4, at 25. 
43 See id. 
44 BOWDEN, supra note 5, at 18. 
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Much of the Mexican public suspects that Calderón launched an aggressive 
military attack on the cartels in an effort to strengthen his political power and 
to show that he can command with a mano dura—a heavy hand.45 Ironically, 
the failure of his attempt to reduce drug-related violence and reign in the 
cartels may suggest otherwise to the Mexican public.46 Mexico’s war on drugs 
has come under criticism in elite political circles. Former presidents of 
Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia have condemned the heavy-handed approach to 
drug trafficking, pointing to the devastating impact of drug-related violence 
and corruption in their countries. They have jointly called for a policy shift that 
focuses on drug use as an issue of health and education.47 
The United States, on the other hand, has characterized the presence of the 
cartels as an “insurgency” requiring the military intervention of the Mérida 
Initiative. In September 2010, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “we 
face an increasing threat from a well-organized network drug trafficking threat 
that is, in some cases, morphing into or making common cause with what we 
would consider an insurgency in Mexico and in Central America.”48 Clinton’s 
statement conflates two very different concepts: political insurgency, which 
usually refers to a unified political cause aiming to take over the government, 
and drug trafficking, which involves cartels seeking to protect their business 
and profits from one another.49  
However, Clinton’s statement suggests, in some ways, a continuation of US 
intervention in Latin America by way of policies that are ostensibly focused on 
                                                 
45 EL SICARIO, supra note 26, at 15. 
46 See Sackur, supra note 36. 
47 See Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Cesar Gaviria & Ernesto Zedillo, The War on Drugs is a 
Failure, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2009,   
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123535114271444981.html. 
48 Laura Carlsen, A Plan Colombia for Mexico, FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS (Sept. 10, 2010), 
http://www.fpif.org/articles/a_plan_colombia_for_mexico [hereinafter A Plan Colombia for 
Mexico]. 
49 See id. 
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antidrug measures.50 Plan Colombia, for example, has existed formally since 
the year 2000 as a military aid program defined primarily as an effort to 
combat drug smuggling.51 The United States has spent millions funding the 
plan despite growing criticism of its reliance on aerial fumigation, its 
connections with right-wing death squads and paramilitaries,52 and its failure to 
decrease the flow of drugs from Colombia to the United States.53 Some critics 
contend, however, that the goal of militarization has never been drug 
eradication, arguing that the program serves instead as a pretext for the United 
States to maintain a long-term “strategy of state terrorism in Colombia” to 
safeguard US economic and political interests. With respect to this latter goal, 
US strategy has been “remarkably effective.”54  
The United States’ approach to fighting the drug trade in Mexico parallels 
its methods used in Colombia. Although Clinton stated that the United States is 
concerned about an insurgency of the cartels,55 the State Department may also 
have other groups in mind.  
President Calderón has faced the demands of powerful social movements 
during his tenure, particularly from the Zapatistas group based in the state of 
Chiapas. The group debuted in 1994 during an armed uprising to protest the 
signing of NAFTA, and it has since sustained its anti-neoliberal demands 
through media campaigns, organized meetings, and demonstrations.56 During 
                                                 
50 See Delgado-Ramos & Romano, supra note 30, at 94–95 (“The Colombia Plan and the 
Mérida Initiative are paradigmatic but not isolated cases of US interference in Latin 
America.”). 
51 DOUG STOKES, AMERICA’S OTHER WAR: TERRORIZING COLOMBIA 93 (2005). 
52 See Doug Stokes, America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia, 39 LIVE JOURNAL 26 (July 
1, 2005), http://bailey83221.livejournal.com/54324.html. 
53 STOKES, supra note 52, at 113. 
54 Id. at 114. 
55 A Plan Colombia for Mexico, supra note 48. Secretary of State Clinton compared the 
political climate in Mexico to that of Colombia twenty years prior, suggesting that Mexico’s 
“insurgency” calls for US military action in the same way that Colombia’s required. Id. 
Notably, Clinton’s comments prompted immediate indignation from the Mexican Congress 
at such an interventionist approach. Id. 
56 See Laura Carlsen, Armoring NAFTA: The Battleground for Mexico’s Future, NACLA 
(Aug. 27, 2008), http://nacla.org/node/4958 [hereinafter Armoring NAFTA]. 
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the presidential campaign of 2006, in which Calderón was elected, the 
Zapatista movement launched its massive Other Campaign, a wide-scale effort 
aimed at building coalitions with resistance groups around Mexico, furthering 
the goal of indigenous autonomy, and providing a platform for anticapitalist 
politics.57 The Campaign directly resisted the dominant agenda of the Mexican 
and US governments, and its strength challenged the legitimacy of Calderón’s 
administration. The Mexican government also faced a teachers’ strike and 
mass rebellion in the state of Oaxaca in 2006.58 
Over the course of the escalation of the war on drugs in Mexico, government 
repression of political movements has become potentially less difficult. Forced 
disappearances, torture, and killings effectively send a message to those who 
would otherwise speak out, advising them to instead engage in self-
censorship—to remain silent. Additionally, the government is able to dismiss 
extrajudicial killings committed by state actors as the work of the cartels.59 
Many critics note that the military presence under the pretext of the war on 
drugs effectively provides the Mexican and US governments a mechanism 
with which to protect elite economic interests and crush social dissent.60  
San Juan Copala, for example, a small indigenous town in Oaxaca, 
supported the Zapatista’s Other Campaign and declared itself to be an 
autonomous municipality in 2007.61 The town was then under siege by state-
supported paramilitaries, who murdered several civilians.62 Following the 
                                                 
57 See Mariana Mora, Zapatista Anticapitalist Politics and the “Other Campaign”: Learning 
from the Struggle for Indigenous Rights and Autonomy, 34 LATIN AM. PERSP. 64, 64–65 
(2007). 
58 See TO DIE IN MEXICO, supra note 4, at 28. 
59 While it is true that the cartels partake in violence, including torture and executions, the 
Mexican army has also been known to commit extrajudicial killings and subsequently blame 
them on drug dealers. See Delgado-Ramos & Romano, supra note 30, at 93 n.3. 
60 See id. at 95–96. Delgado-Ramos and Romano argue that the war on drugs in Latin 
America represents a “stabilization-destabilization” program meant to protect US economic 
interests and its access to natural resources. See id. at 103. 
61 Paramilitaries Kill Two Human Rights Activists in Oaxaca, DEMOCRACY NOW!  
(Apr. 30, 2010),  
www.democracynow.org/2010/4/30/paramilitaries_kill_two_human_rights_activists. 
62 Id.  
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assassination of two human rights activists, at least one journalist wrote that 
“the US-funded war on drugs certainly creates a cover for these kinds of 
politically motivated attacks.”63 Given the social mobilizations that have 
followed NAFTA, particularly related to the Zapatista uprising, it may be “no 
wonder” that elite economic and state interests on both sides of the border 
“saw the need to shield the agreement from potential attacks” through the 
increased militarization of civil society.64 
III. NEOLIBERALISM AT HOME AND ABROAD: ECONOMIC 
PROGRAMS, SECURITY INTERESTS, AND THE USE OF SHOCK 
Neoliberalism refers to the set of trends and ideas that have come to 
dominate political discourse and practice in various areas, including 
international trade liberalization, privatization programs, immigration 
enforcement, and drug policy.65 As a concept, it facilitates making broad, 
contextual connections between trends that otherwise may appear disparate and 
unrelated.66 Academics, political activists, and other thinkers often use the 
word “neoliberalism” to describe the political climate and set of policies, 
trends, and narratives that have promoted and justified the upward 
redistribution of wealth within the United States and various elite arenas of 
global politics over the last forty years.67 
Neoliberal economics narratives often utilize the concept of laissez-faire, 
which refers to minimizing state interference with the activities of corporations 
and the accumulation of capital by private actors.68 On an international level, 
                                                 
63 Id.  
64 See Armoring NAFTA, supra note 56.  
65 See DUGGAN, supra note 13, at xi–xii. 
66 See DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS 
POLITICS, AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 49 (2011). 
67 See DUGGAN, supra note 13, at xi. Although neoliberalism has been hailed by its 
supporters as “universally inevitable,” its vision actually represents a relatively recent 
historical development. Id. at xiii. 
68 See CYNTHIA KAUFMAN, IDEAS FOR ACTION: RELEVANT THEORY FOR RADICAL 
CHANGE 109 (2003). 
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free trade has been promoted as the path for success for all countries, although 
such policies often favor countries of the global North.69 On local levels, 
systematic privatization has generated additional markets and profit incentives 
in areas that were formerly part of the public sector, such as health care, 
education, and drinking water.70 The political success of these programs has 
been grounded in the conceptual framework of competition, emphasizing 
personal responsibility and individual freedom.71 As a result of these 
programs, many worldwide elites have been able to expand their access to 
wealth and resources, while middle- and low-income groups have experienced 
a decrease in their standard of living.72 
Numerous scholars, activists, and communities have challenged neoliberal 
development on various grounds, deconstructing the myths of market self-
regulation and pointing to its devastating impact on communities that are 
sidelined by neoliberal programs.73 This section starts by laying out the 
characteristic economic policies that define neoliberal programs and that have 
led to the rise of corporate power and influence on government policy-making. 
It then briefly explores the neoliberal state’s increased reliance on surveillance, 
detention, and other forms of social control, looking specifically at the United 
                                                 
69 See id. 
70 See id. at 109–10. 
71 Id. See KLEIN, supra note 2, at 52. 
72 See KAUFMAN, supra note 68, at 110–11. 
73 See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, PROFIT OVER PEOPLE: NEOLIBERALISM AND GLOBAL 
ORDER 24, 39, 93 (1999) (describing the pro-corporate, free market system of global 
capitalism that has developed since World War II under the direction of the United States, 
creating profits and power for elites while deepening socio-economic disparity and class 
warfare); JON JETER, FLAT BROKE IN THE FREE MARKET: HOW GLOBALIZATION FLEECED 
WORKING PEOPLE xi-xii (2009) (examining how global, neoliberal, free-market programs 
function as a continuation of colonialism and brought “unqualified economic disaster for 
ordinary people worldwide”); JOSÉ SARAMAGO ET AL., THE ZAPATISTA READER 2, 5 (Tom 
Hayden ed., 2002) (Providing a series of political writings and eyewitness accounts of the 
Zapatista rebellion); KAUFMAN, supra note 68, at 48–54, 108–111 (offering an accessible 
analysis of capitalism, neoliberalism, as well as alternate sets of ideas); DUGGAN, supra note 
13, at xi-xiii (describing the rise of neoliberalism as a product of attacks on the New Deal 
and on downwardly redistributive social movements, pro-business activism, various “culture 
wars,” and an emergent non-redistributive form of “equality”). 
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States’ domestic war on drugs and immigration enforcement policies. This 
section closes by examining Klein’s critique presented in The Shock Doctrine, 
which shows how neoliberalism capitalizes on periods of crisis—whether 
perceived, actual, or created—to impose and maintain free market economic 
policies while simultaneously contracting out crisis response and security 
responsibilities to corporate beneficiaries.74 
A. Economic Policies Within the Neoliberal Framework 
Within the context of economic policy, neoliberal programs tend to demand 
privatization, deregulation of government, and the slashing of social 
spending.”75 These stipulations are justified by an underlying belief in laissez-
faire economics and the idea that markets should be free from state 
interference.76 Yet, as this section attempts to show, in reality, those demands 
function as mechanisms that expand corporate earnings while simultaneously 
generating profits for politicians, producing a “powerful ruling alliance” 
between the two groups.77 
The systematic privatization and deregulation of goods and services occurs 
under the banner of “free market” competition.78 On the ground, privatization 
means that allegedly public programs and services are removed from 
government control and contracted out, or placed in private, profit-generating 
hands.79 This trend is pervasive; it includes everything from education and 
garbage collection to the construction and management of prisons and 
immigration detention centers.80 Privatization is often justified as a way of 
improving the efficiency of “plodding, incompetent” public programs and 
state-owned industries.81 Yet, this rationalization ignores the reality that the 
                                                 
74 See KLEIN, supra note 2, at 8–11, 15, 18. 
75 See id. at 9–10. 
76 See id. at 9, 15. 
77 Id. at 15. 
78 See DUGGAN, supra note 13, at 12; KLEIN, supra note 2, at 9. 
79 See DUGGAN, supra note 13, at 12. 
80 See id. 
81 Id. 
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greater “productivity” of the private sector is often attained through flawed 
means: lower pay for employees, worse workplace conditions, and lesser 
quality services, materials, or products.82 Additionally, privatization removes 
wealth and decision-making power from mechanisms of public 
accountability.83 The goal of profit generation supplants nonmonetary priorities 
such as the health and welfare of people and communities.84 By the same 
token, the nonmonetary costs—including abandonment, trauma, terror, death, 
and detention—paid by those whose lives are affected by privately made 
decisions remain unaccounted for when businesses balance their budget.85 
These types of serious costs associated with neoliberalism are particularly 
salient within the scope of this article. As discussed below, the privatization of 
warfare, incarceration, immigration enforcement, and other security-related 
industries has increasingly come to dominate public policy decisions made in 
these arenas, favoring profits over people.86 
Neoliberalism is also characterized by the dismantling of public systems for 
addressing poverty or providing basic social services.87 Within the United 
States, “antistate” government actors have advocated for the state’s retreat 
from various areas of social safety nets, including welfare and public 
                                                 
82 Id. 
83 See id. See also CHOMSKY, supra note 73, at 132 (describing the concentration of power 
into corporate hands as an “attack on democracy”). 
84 See, e.g., CHOMSKY, supra note 73, at 148 (indicating that while financial investors are 
given wide access to move assets without government or public interference, democratic 
demands such as local ownership, living wage standards, consumer protections, and 
environmental provisions are undermined and barred). 
85 See Ruth Wilson Gilmore, In the Shadow of the Shadow State, in THE REVOLUTION WILL 
NOT BE FUNDED: BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 41, 43 (INCITE! 
Women of Color Against Violence ed., 2007). Ruth Wilson Gilmore points out that “the 
devastating effect of industrialized punishment has hidden, noneconomic as well as 
measurable dollar costs to governments and households.” Id. 
86 See KLEIN, supra note 2, at 12. The phrase “profit over people” is the title of Noam 
Chomsky’s book, supra note 73. 
87 See Christine Ahn, Democratizing American Philanthropy, in THE REVOLUTION WILL 
NOT BE FUNDED: BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 63 (INCITE! Women of 
Color Against Violence ed., 2007). 
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housing.88 Instead of having a systemic approach to social welfare, many social 
service functions are fulfilled today by a “shadow state” of nonprofit and 
volunteer organizations.89 The costs of public welfare are thereby transferred 
from government agencies to individuals, families, and communities.90 Many 
scholars and activists have characterized the downsizing of the state in this 
capacity as a long-term process of abandoning specific sectors of society.91 
Additionally, this process has allowed the “huge transfers of public wealth to 
private hands” that characterizes neoliberalism.92 
Privatization, deregulation, and reducing social spending represent the “free-
market trinity”93 of neoliberal stipulations; together, these demands have 
facilitated “the rise of corporatism.”94 In a neoliberal climate, big businesses 
and government are separated only by “hazy and ever-shifting lines”; 
increasingly, corporate and political spheres have merged.95 For economic 
elites, the benefits of organizing wealth in this way are unparalleled. But 
because true neoliberal programs leave the majority of the population outside 
of the circle of prosperity, the protection of corporatist arrangements often 
involve the use of “aggressive surveillance […], mass incarceration, shrinking 
civil liberties and often, though not always, torture.”96 
                                                 
88 Gilmore, supra note 85, at 41, 44. See Rickke Mananzala & Dean Spade, The Nonprofit 
Industrial Complex and Trans Resistance, 5 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y 53, at 55 
(2008). 
89 Gilmore, supra note 85, at 45. 
90 See Mananzala & Spade, supra note 88, at 55–56. 
91 See Gilmore, supra note 85, at 44. 
92 KLEIN, supra note 2, at 15. 
93 Id. at 77. 
94 Id. at 19. DUGGAN, supra note 13, at xiii (indicating that neoliberalism represents “a kind 
of backroom deal among the financial, business, and political elites based in the United 
States and Europe.”). 
95 KLEIN, supra note 2, at 15. 
96 Id. 
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B. Legitimate Violence: Security and Surveillance in the Neoliberal State 
In contrast to the narratives of freedom and democracy promoted in the 
context of neoliberal programs, many people and communities actually 
experience heightened surveillance and exposure to state-sanctioned violence 
in the context of the neoliberal framework. The neoliberal security state97 is 
less concerned with mitigating the human costs or social fallout of market-
based policies; instead, much of its power is directed at enforcing 
neoliberalism’s disparities through the threat and use of legitimate violence—
violence that is validated by or carried out by the government.98 The 
development of security and surveillance policies within the United States is 
particularly visible in trends such as the rise of mass incarceration, particularly 
as a result of the domestic war on drugs, and heightened immigration 
enforcement, both of which help to set the stage for discussing the drug war in 
Mexico. Notably, these programs have relied on identity and cultural politics, 
particularly the politics of race, to legitimize heightened security and 
surveillance measures.99 
Critics of the US “prison industrial complex” argue that the rise in mass 
incarceration, which began under President Richard Nixon through law-and-
order policies, represents a response to the social movements and political 
upheavals that faced the Nixon administration.100 Subsequently, the tough-on-
crime approach was continued under President Ronald Reagan as a method of 
managing the socio-economic dislocation produced by neoliberal economic 
                                                 
97 Scholar Chandan Reddy uses the phrase “neoliberal security state” to describe a vision of 
the state that centers the protection of market capitalism and validates the use of force by 
state apparatuses to access those markets, including through military efforts over 
international boundaries. See CHANDAN REDDY, FREEDOM WITH VIOLENCE: RACE, 
SEXUALITY, AND THE US STATE 210 (2011). 
98 See id. at 210. The neoliberal state, which emerged in the late twentieth century, 
represents “an intense reconstruction of the state form,” both in its orientation toward the 
international economy and the use of force. Id. at 138. 
99 See DUGGAN, supra note 13, at xii. Duggan further states that the politics of identity and 
culture, including the politics of race, gender, sexuality, and class, have been “central to the 
entire project” of neoliberalism. Id. 
100 Id. at 18. 
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adjustments.101 Law-and-order policies are racially neutral on their face, 
focusing on the “threat of crime to ‘average’ citizens, even as actual crime 
rates have declined,” but their impact has undeniably racialized 
consequences.102 Civil rights lawyer and author Michelle Alexander has been 
at the forefront of exposing the role of the war on drugs103 in creating a 
criminal system that functions as a form of social control targeting 
communities of color.104 Alexander contends that drug laws have replaced 
slavery and Jim Crow as mechanisms for creating and enforcing a racial caste 
system.105 The “get tough” movement and the war on drugs are directly 
responsible for the rise in prison populations since the 1980s, and three-fourths 
of the individuals that have been incarcerated during the war on drugs are 
people of color.106 With 2.3 million people107 presently behind bars, mass 
                                                 
101 See id. 
102 Id. 
103 Richard Nixon was the first US president to use the phrase “war on drugs,” but the phrase 
is more closely associated with the policies of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. 
Bush, and its approach continues to dominate US criminal policy and discourse today. See 
Jeff Yates, Todd A. Collins & Gabriel J. Chin, A War on Drugs or a War on Immigrants? 
Expanding the Definition of ‘Drug Trafficking’ in Determining Aggravated Felon Status for 
Noncitizens, 64 MD. L. REV. 875, 875–56 (2005). 
104 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 7–8 (1st ed. 2010). see also NEWJIMCROW.ORG,  
http://newjimcrow.com/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). Alexander explains that the war on 
drugs evolved as part of a racially coded “get tough” strategy to gain votes among poor and 
working-class white voters who feared the gains made by African Americans during the civil 
rights movement. See On Eve of MLK Day, Michelle Alexander & Randall Robinson on the 
Mass Incarceration of Black America, DEMOCRACY NOW!, (Jan. 13, 2012),  
http://www.democracynow.org/2012/1/13/on_eve_of_mlk_day_michelle. 
105 See ALEXANDER, supra note 104, at 11–12. 
106 Racial Disparity, THE SENTENCING PROJECT,  
http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=122 (last visited Jan. 20, 2012). It is 
important to note that people of color are no more likely to use drugs than white people. 
Yates, Collins & Chin, supra note 103, at 880. 
107 Incarceration, THE SENTENCING PROJECT,  
http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=107 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) 
(“The United States is the world’s leader in incarceration with 2.3 million people currently in 
the nation’s prisons or jails—a 500% increase over the past thirty years.”). 
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incarceration in the United States functions as a form of social control that is 
“unparalleled in the world’s history.”108 
The “get tough” movement and the war on drugs have also targeted 
noncitizens, creating a political climate so harsh that it is often referred to as 
the “criminalization” of immigration policy.109 One aspect of this 
criminalization has been the severe penalties imposed on non-citizens for 
contact with the criminal system.110 Beginning in the 1980s, deportation 
became an increasingly common collateral consequence for noncitizens who 
have received criminal convictions.111 During the 1980s, the media and many 
politicians emphasized the urgency of “the criminal-alien problem,” arguing 
that the Immigration and Naturalization Service was not sufficiently 
addressing the issue. This prompted Congress to pass legislation addressing the 
intersection of criminal and immigration law, imposing increasingly harsh 
sanctions on noncitizens for criminal and drug violations.112 Over the span of a 
decade, 30,000 people were deported on the basis of criminal or drug 
offenses.113 By 2011, the number jumped substantially; at least 44,653 
noncitizens convicted of drug-related crimes were deported in just one year.114  
The cooperation between criminal enforcement and civil immigration 
authorities represents a second method of criminalization.115 One of the most 
concerning aspects of current immigration enforcement policies is the use of 
                                                 
108 ALEXANDER, supra note 104, at 8. The United States has the highest rate of imprisonment 
in the world. See Incarceration, supra note 100. 
109 Teresa A. Miller, A New Look at Neo-Liberal Economic Policies and the Criminalization 
of Undocumented Migration, 61 SMU L. REV. 171, 180 (2008). 
110 See id. at 180–81. 
111 Yates, Collins & Chin, supra note 103, at 884.  
112 See id. 
113 Id. In contrast, around 48,000 people had been deported for criminal convictions over 
the previous seventy-two years. Id. 
114 Round-up: Immigration and Enforcement Systems Under Fire Amidst Record-Number 
Deportations, DEPORTATION NATION (Oct. 20, 2011),  
http://www.deportationnation.org/2011/10/round-up-immigration-and-enforcement-systems-
under-fire-admist-record-number-deportations/.The United States deported an unprecedented 
number of people in fiscal year 2011, removing 396,906 individuals. Id. 
115 See Miller, supra note 109, at 181–82. 
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state and local police, county jails, and the criminal system to channel 
noncitizens into the expanding network of immigration detention centers and 
to place them in deportation proceedings.116 As a result, Mexicans who migrate 
north as a result of the drug war at home, as many do,117 and who are non-US 
citizens, may also be affected by the war on drugs in the United States. 
The neoliberal security state utilizes cultural and identity politics, including 
racialized narratives, to justify its reliance on systems of violence to ostensibly 
promote security.118 In this context, the types of “aggressive surveillance”119 
listed here, including mass incarceration, immigration detention, and 
deportation, appear to represent practices that are characteristic of the 
neoliberal security state and that serve to facilitate the enforcement of 
disparities produced by corporatist arrangements. The mechanisms of “law and 
order” function as legitimate in the sense that they are legally protected and 
constitute central aspects of political discourse. The human rights abuses 
committed by the Mexican security forces are legitimate too, in the sense that 
they are state-sanctioned and are committed by authorities that benefit from 
having a monopoly of force. Law enforcement officials “openly admit their 
fear or unwillingness” to investigate cases involving state abuses. As the 
family of one victim of human rights violations committed by state security 
                                                 
116 See Melissa Keaney & Joan Friedland, Overview of the Key ICE ACCESS Programs: 
287(g), The Criminal Alien Program, and Secure Communities, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CENTER 
(Nov. 2009), http://www.nilc.org/ice-access-2009-11-05.html. 
117 The escalation of drug-related violence has caused many Mexicans to leave home, 
some applying for asylum in the United States based on their experience of persecution 
and their fear of returning home. See Andrew Becker & Patrick J. McDonnell, Mexico’s 
Drug War Creates New Class of Refugees, L. A. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2009) 
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/latinamerica/la-na-asylum4-
2009mar04,0,2188107.story. 
118 See DUGGAN, supra note 13, at 14–15 (“The goal of raising corporate profits has never 
been pursued separately from the rearticulation of hierarchies of race, gender, and sexuality 
in the United States and around the globe.”). The politics of race, culture, and identity 
undeniably play a role in shaping neoliberal security politics, including anti-drug trafficking 
programs. See id. at 3. 
119 See Klein, supra note 2, at 15. 
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forces was told by a Mexican prosecutor, “you can’t win against the 
military.”120  
C. The Shock Doctrine 
“Crises are, in a way, democracy-free zones—gaps in politics as 
usual when the need for consent and consensus do not seem to 
apply.”121 
—Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster 
Capitalism 
 “Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change,” wrote Milton 
Friedman, venerated leader of the rise in the free market and, with it, 
unrestrained capitalism,122 in 1982.123 The crux of Klein’s thesis in The Shock 
Doctrine is that democracy must be suspended in order to implement true free-
market reforms and that the precondition for this suspension is often presented 
by some type of significant collective fear or trauma.124 Friedman himself was 
aware of this, which Klein points out. For many years, his free-market ideas 
were sidelined by the mainstream—until, beginning in the 1970s, he helped 
pioneer the strategy of imposing politically unpopular changes during periods 
of crisis when democratic channels were (temporarily) disengaged.125 
In the 1950s, Friedman was the driving force behind the University of 
Chicago’s Department of Economics, whose fundamentalist approach to free-
market economics came to be known simply as Chicago School economics, an 
approach whose influence on today’s global economic systems is difficult to 
overstate.126 Friedman’s vision of the market allowed no space for state 
regulations. He proposed that the minimum wage should be eliminated, that 
corporations should be able to sell goods across national boundaries, that 
                                                 
120 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note, 3 at 11. 
121 KLEIN, supra note 2, at 140. 
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124 See id. at 18–21. 
125 See id. at 21–22. 
126 See id. at 49–52. 
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governments should cease to protect workers or local industries, that taxes, if 
they must exist, should be minimal, and that all income levels should pay taxes 
at the same rate.127 He called for the privatization of health care, education, 
pensions, and national parks.128 He contended that economic problems could 
be solved by a stricter application of free-market fundamentals and called for 
the removal of barriers to profit making by private entities.129 For some time 
though, Friedman could not point to any examples where these strategies had 
worked, much less been tried, as he claimed they would.130 
An opportunity came in 1956 when the US State Department collaborated 
with Chicago’s Economics Department to bring Chilean students to study 
under Friedman and his colleagues. The program apparently sought out 
Chilean students because Chile had become a breeding ground for 
developmentalist economics, which the program intended to change.131 
Developmentalism, which had taken hold in several countries around the 
globe, aimed to break the dependence of third world countries on colonial 
powers through nationalizing industries, subsidizing local businesses, building 
strong unions, and blocking foreign imports with protectionist tariffs.132 US 
and European corporations that were invested in Latin America increasingly 
felt threatened by such reforms and pressured their governments to act on their 
behalf.133 Friedman’s mantra of severing the state from all interference in the 
economy aligned with corporate demands for less regulation, and the State 
Department organized for the Chilean students to study under him for that 
                                                 
127 See id. at 57. 
128 See id. 
129 See id. at 50–51. 
130 See id. at 51, 59. 
131 See id. at 59–60. 
132 See id. 54–55. 
133 See id. at 58. The CIA-backed coups in 1953 in Iran and in 1954 in Guatemala were 
aimed at countering developmentalism and protecting corporate interests. Id. 
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reason.134 By 1963, many in the group returned to Chile and set up a Friedman-
centered economics department at their home institution, thereby allowing 
hundreds of Chileans to study the same curriculum without leaving the 
country.135 The students who learned this free-market ideology became known 
around the region as “los Chicago Boys.”136 
The Chicago Boys had trouble breaking into Chile’s mainstream economic 
policy discourses, as the country was still focused on developmentalism. In 
1970, all three major political parties favored nationalizing the country’s 
biggest industry, the copper mines, which were controlled by US companies.137 
Salvador Allende was elected president in 1970, and US transnationals feared 
the loss of property, investments, and profit under his Popular Unity 
government. For example, the International Telephone and Telegraph 
Company (ITT) owned 70 percent of Chile’s phone system, which was slated 
to become nationalized. The company secretly worked with the CIA and the 
State Department to block Allende’s inauguration,138 but by 1973, Allende had 
gained significant political backing in Chile.139 
A group of Chilean business leaders who had been educated in Chicago, and 
whose activities were funded by the CIA, formulated a two-prong plan to 
counter Allende’s economic program: (1) to work in coalition with the military 
to prepare for a regime change and (2) to design specific plans for the 
neoliberal restructuring of Chile’s economy.140 On September 11, 1973, 
Allende was overthrown in a violent coup, resulting in the installation of the 
                                                 
134 See id. at 56–57, 59–60. One hundred Chilean students studied free market economic 
policies directly under Friedman at the University of Chicago between 1957 and 1970 with 
all tuition and expenses paid for by US taxpayers and foundations. Id. at 60. 
135 See id. at 61–62. 
136 Id. at 62. 
137 See id. 63. 
138 See id. at 65 (writing that ITT presented the Chilean opposition with $1 million dollars in 
bribes). 
139 See id. at 66. By 1973, $8 million dollars in covert monies had been spent. Id. 
140 See id. at 70–71. A US Senate investigation revealed that “over 75 percent” of this 
organization’s funding originated in the CIA. Id. at 71. 
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military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet, who remained president of 
Chile until 1990.141 On all accounts, the toppling of Allende represents a 
military exploit. But Orlando Letelier, ambassador to Washington under 
Allende, had a different view. He saw the takeover as an “equal partnership” 
between the generals and the intellectuals: the military provided the brutal 
force, and the Chicago Boys wrote the free-market economic program for the 
country’s new government.142 
Pinochet’s rule was to be marked by three discrete types of shock. First, 
there was the shock of the military coup, which led to the death of President 
Allende and transformed the capitol into a war zone.143 Immediately thereafter 
came what Friedman termed economic “shock treatment,”144 as well as the 
shock of widespread torture and the executions of civilians.145 
Friedman explicitly advised General Pinochet against the gradual imposition 
of free market policies—he used the phrase economic “shock treatment” in his 
communications with the General, assuring him that a strict application of free 
market fundamentals would allow the Chilean economy to self-correct its high 
inflation, which had jumped to 375 percent during the first year and a half of 
Chicago-style reforms under Pinochet.146 Friedman advised cutting 
government spending by 25 percent and to move towards completely free 
trade.147 He suggested that the hundreds of thousands of people who would be 
let go from their jobs in the public sector would be able to find work in the 
                                                 
141 See Jonathan Kandell, Augusto Pinochet, Dictator Who Ruled by Terror in Chile, Dies at 
91, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2006,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/11/world/americas/11pinochet.html?pagewanted=all. 
142 KLEIN, supra note 2, at 71. The Chicago Boys wrote a 500-page document known as “The 
Brick,” detailing the economic program that the military junta followed in Chile. See id. The 
policies that it outlines would later be imposed on numerous other countries in the context of 
various types of crises. See id. at 78. 
143 See id. at 71, 75–76. 
144 Id. at 71. 
145 See id. at 76–77. 
146 Id. at 79, 80–81. 
147 Id. at 81. 
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private one.148 Following this advice, Pinochet privatized nearly 500 state-
owned companies and banks, releasing them immediately into private hands, 
and cut spending by 27 percent, to half of what it had been under Allende, with 
health and education sectors taking the deepest blows.149 
Pinochet was a brutal dictator; his regime was notorious for its human rights 
violations.150 Within days of Pinochet taking power, approximately 13,500 
civilians were arrested and detained.151 Thousands were held at the two main 
football stadiums in the capital city of Santiago, where they were tortured and 
executed.152 The regime was characterized by repression—the press was 
subjected to censorship, and labor unions and strikes were prohibited.153 Over 
3,200 people disappeared or were executed and nearly 28,000 people were 
tortured,154 sending a clear and threatening message to any potential dissenters. 
At least 80,000 were imprisoned and 200,000 fled the country in political 
exile.155 The Chicago School economists refused to recognize any relationship 
between their policies and the use of political terror,156 even though the 
Chicago Boys worked with the military in the period leading up to the coup 
and during the economic restructuring of Chile took place immediately upon 
the government overthrow.157 
Pinochet’s economic shock program brought extreme wealth to a limited 
number of elites,158 but it also signaled the onset of widespread poverty in 
Chile. Prices soared while wages dropped.159 Approximately 74 percent of the 
income of an average Chilean family went to buy bread, while basic items such 
                                                 
148 See id. at 80–81. 
149 Id. at 82. 
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as milk and bus fare became out of reach for many.160 Privatization was 
imposed on Chile’s public schools, its health care system, and even its social 
security system.161 The socio-economic situation was so dire that one of the 
Chicago Boys, somewhat of a dissident from the group, drew a direct line from 
the brutality of the free-market economic policies to the violence that Pinochet 
used to repress civil society, linking the two as mutually reinforcing. He wrote 
that Friedman’s economic adjustments brought so much suffering that the 
changes could not have been “imposed or carried out without the twin 
elements that underlie them all: military force and political terror.”162 
The majority of the people who were detained, tortured, and executed in 
Chile were not “extremists” or “fanatics,” as the government claimed; instead, 
they were people that the dictatorship had identified as potential threats to its 
neoliberal economic program.163 Systematic raids directed at workers in 
factories led to the mass arrest of people involved in the labor movement 
beginning on the day of the coup.164 Farmers were also targeted. Not only did 
the state’s terror campaign remove potential roadblocks to the economic 
program, but it also effectively sent a message to those who witnessed the 
disappearances, ensuring that the streets remained “clear and calm.”165 Sergio 
de Castro, who was educated at the Chicago School and intimately involved 
with the planning of the coup, did not turn a blind eye to the military excesses 
of the regime as he served as minister of economics under Pinochet. To the 
contrary, he wrote that the neoliberal, free-market reforms never could have 
happened before the coup because public opinion was “very much against” 
such policies. He continued, “[i]t was our luck that President Pinochet 
understood and had the character to withstand criticism,” noting that 
                                                 
160 Id. at 84. 
161 See id. 
162 Id. (quoting Chicago School-educated Gunder Frank). 
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“‘authoritarian government’ is best suited to safeguarding economic freedom 
because of its ‘impersonal’ use of power.”166 
The shock doctrine model that emerged in Chile under Pinochet is based on 
exploitation of a period of crisis in order to push through radical economic 
changes. The privatization of crisis creation and crisis response167 characterizes 
what Klein terms the “shock doctrine” today. Various aspects of the US 
national security apparatus have undergone a profound privatization process, 
particularly under the Bush administration. Functions that were once iconic to 
the state law, such as the military, border control, prisons, and surveillance 
technology, have become parts of the private sector.168 This arrangement 
represents a new form of disaster capitalism within which “wars and disaster 
responses are so fully privatized that they are themselves the new market.”169 
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense under President George W. Bush, 
was close friends with Milton Friedman, who admired Rumsfeld for his 
commitment to deregulated markets.170 Rumsfeld is now said to have presided 
over a “transformation” of the US military, reducing the number of its troops, 
and outsourcing many of its functions to private contractors. While the 
Pentagon was already notorious for contracting out weapons manufacturing, 
the hiring of corporations such as Blackwater and Halliburton to “perform 
duties ranging from high-risk chauffeuring to prisoner interrogation to catering 
to health care” represented an entirely new arena of privatization.171 These 
changes did not reduce the budget of the military (Rumsfeld requested an 11 
percent budget increase shortly after taking the position); instead, in line with 
corporatist principles, the move redistributed funds from the public to the 
private sphere.172 
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Dick Cheney, vice president under Bush, also helped to advance the use of 
private contractors in the military context, an endeavor he had begun earlier as 
Secretary of Defense under Bush Sr. when he hired Halliburton’s engineering 
division, Brown & Root, to identify tasks performed by US troops that could 
be contracted out for a profit. This initiative led to the Logistics Civil 
Augmentation Program, or LOGCAP, and the creation of a service contract for 
providing largely unlimited “logistical support” for the military, which 
Halliburton later won.173 Cheney then moved into the private sphere during the 
Clinton administration, serving as CEO of Halliburton Company. Under his 
leadership, the company nearly doubled the amount of money that it procured 
through contracts with the US government from $1.2 billion to $2.3 billion, 
particularly by providing troops abroad with services such as “fast-food 
outlets, supermarkets, movie theaters, and high-tech gyms.”174 Lockheed 
Martin, the world’s largest defense contractor, similarly moved into logistical 
support during this period under the leadership of Cheney’s wife, gaining 
contracts to sort the mail, cut Social Security checks, and conduct the US 
census.175 
This corporatist orientation means policy decision making is increasingly 
framed by private interests while government activities are designed to 
function as an unending marketplace for private, contract-seeking agencies.176 
The federal government’s response to the 9/11 attacks, for example, has been 
characterized by the creation of the war on terror, whose goals appear to be 
focused on “regulat[ing] and control[ing] the citizenry”177 and creating a 
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profitable, long-term market centered on the homeland security industry178—as 
opposed to a policy that prioritizes the safety of its residents.179 The homeland 
security industry is now larger than Hollywood and the music business, 
contracting out any number of surveillance, intelligence gathering, and data 
mining technologies and services.180 Major contracts, such as that for US 
VISIT, a screening program that takes digital fingerprints of visitors and 
noncitizens upon arrival in the US, have been awarded based on political 
connections instead of quality products.181 With little oversight provided by the 
Department of Homeland Security, companies may promote their products at 
flashy trade shows, overcharge for their services, and provide faulty products, 
with little to no accountability, particularly to constituents.182 As the New York 
Times discerned in 2007, “Without a public debate or formal policy decision, 
contractors have become a virtual fourth branch of government.”183 
There is little discussion of the implications of being “engaged in a fully 
privatized war built to have no end.”184 The 2003 invasion of Iraq, arranged 
under the auspices of the “Shock and Awe” strategy, which was conceptually 
developed at the National Defense University,185 was designed to overwhelm 
and psychologically torture the public by destroying its phone system, 
electricity, and cultural fabric contained in the nation’s museums and 
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libraries.186 The rebuilding of Iraq was then contracted out. Private accountants 
were hired to “build a ‘market-driven system’” in the country; think tanks were 
hired to help privatize Iraqi companies, and private security firms and defense 
contractors were hired to train Iraq’s new army and police.187 Without 
oversight and not subject to any regulations, these companies often proceeded 
to subcontract out the duties, and the bulk of the work was never completed.188 
At home, the war on drugs similarly appears to be built to have no end, 
creating a long-term source of profits for certain security-oriented companies. 
Drug laws take most of the credit for filling our prisons, and private prison 
companies continue to benefit from these laws by obtaining government 
contracts. As governor of Texas, George Bush increased the number of private 
prisons from twenty-six to forty-two, despite stories of prisoner maltreatment 
within such institutions.189 Since 9/11, private-prison companies have 
benefitted as national security concerns have been mobilized to target and 
detain noncitizens.190 Companies in the business of immigration detention can 
be paid roughly $85 per detainee, per day, by the Department of Homeland 
Security.191 The US government’s increasing reliance on detention in the arena 
of immigration enforcement has been partially driven by private prison 
corporations seeking to expand their government contracts.192 
In essence, the shock doctrine allows neoliberal capitalism to find new 
markets in every step of its own expansion: the creation of disaster or crisis 
(the drug problem, the “criminal alien” problem, the devastation of Iraq); the 
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neoliberal restructuring that often occurs behind closed doors during moments 
of crisis (the economic changes under Pincohet); and the response to disaster 
(rebuilding Iraq, imprisoning drug offenders, detaining immigrants). 
Intervention no longer simply represents a means to the end of protecting 
corporate interests, as it did in Chile.193 The process of destruction and 
reorientation is now so “fully privatized” that intervention is the end itself, 
creating deep and long-lasting opportunities for companies to profit from the 
exploitation of crisis.194 
IV. NEOLIBERALISM & RESISTANCE IN MEXICO 
The signing of NAFTA in 1994 represents the formalization of 
neoliberalism in Mexico.195 While the agreement has been commended in elite 
circles for opening corporate investment across national borders, it has also 
been condemned for undermining the gains of working communities,196 
weakening environment regulations,197 and threatening the food security of 
Mexico.198 The fact that NAFTA opened borders for the movement of capital, 
but not for workers, also faces widespread criticism.199 NAFTA’s impact 
warrants a deeper critique, however, with respect to the wealth gained by 
transnational companies on the one hand, and the systemic violence 
experienced by the poor and middles classes on the other. In a climate of 
deepening social inequalities, anxiety about protecting business interests in 
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Mexico has risen, meaning that political dissent, including organized 
movements like the Zapatistas, may be of heightened concern for the Mexican 
and US governments. 
A. NAFTA Expanded Corporate Wealth and Undermined Collective Socio-
Economic Security 
In terms of trade integration, NAFTA is a success. The agreement’s primary 
goal was to diminish barriers to investment and trade, and, by those 
measurements, NAFTA has succeeded.200 A small circle of investors have 
prospered under NAFTA. By 2005, merchandise trading between Mexico and 
the United States had increased 227 percent.201 Wal-Mart became the largest 
retailer in Mexico.202 US-based agribusiness giant Cargill saw its income 
increase by 660 percent since NAFTA began, reaching $3.95 billion in fiscal 
year 2007–08.203 
NAFTA’s impact, however, on the socio-economic security of many people 
in Mexico has been staggering. The treaty’s launch was marked by a monetary 
crisis in 1994, the year it came into effect. The value of the peso dropped from 
3.4 to 7.2 to the dollar within a week, and prices in Mexico soared by 24 
percent in the first four months of 1994.204 Privatization allowed Mexican 
industries to be sold to US-based corporations, which meant that unions were 
busted and workplace conditions worsened.205 Mexico’s main north-south rail 
line came under the ownership of the US-based company Union Pacific, and 
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employment in the rail industry dropped from over 90,000 to 36,000.206 The 
leaders of the railroad union, who once commanded a national presence, were 
imprisoned, and the union disappeared from Mexican politics.207 Longshoring 
wages, once $100–160 per day, plummeted to $40–50 per day after the 
Mexican ports were sold to US-based corporations.208 By 1995, one year into 
the agreement, one million jobs had been lost.209 The growth of corporate retail 
like Wal-Mart affects the livelihood of innumerable family-owned and small 
businesses. Twelve years after NAFTA, real wages for Mexican workers had 
been reduced by 22 percent, even though worker productivity had risen by 45 
percent.210 
Changes in agricultural policies under NAFTA also had a devastating 
impact in Mexico. While subsidies from the Mexican government to its 
farmers became illegal, major subsidies from the US government to its growers 
remained protected.211 After the elimination of Mexican subsidies, hundreds of 
thousands of family farms and small farms could no longer make a living by 
selling the food that they produced.212 Rural communities that once survived 
on subsistence agriculture now face malnutrition and starvation, and Mexico is 
increasingly dependent on expensive food imports.213 Two million farmers 
have been forced to leave their land, internally displaced or forced into the 
migration stream toward the United States.214 
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As a result of NAFTA’s impact on Mexico’s economy, more people left 
Mexico for the United States in the years after NAFTA was passed than in any 
other period,215 with over six million people crossing the border within thirteen 
years of NAFTA’s implementation.216 Yet, the US immigration debate does 
not acknowledge the role of economic displacement in producing the Mexico-
US migration stream.217 The US immigration system also fails to acknowledge 
this role—most workers displaced from Mexico since NAFTA have arrived in 
the United States without immigration authorization.218  
Notably, the displacement of people and their subsequent undocumented 
movement across borders tends to benefit both the cartels and US companies 
that depend on cheap labor.219 Transnational cartels make tens of millions of 
dollars each year engaged in the unauthorized movement of migrants.220 Entire 
US industries, including the agricultural sector and food processing,221 the 
paper industry,222 tourism—including the hotel and restaurant industries—and 
domestic services223 depend on migrant labor. Many companies profit 
immensely from the labor of undocumented workers, who are “more 
vulnerable and socially isolated,” allowing for their work to be compensated at 
lower rates.224 The displacement of workers caused by neoliberal reforms, 
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including NAFTA, has provided cartels with a steady stream of “walking 
merchandise”225: people seeking assistance in crossing the border without 
authorization despite the severe risks they face on such a journey. 
Displacement has also supplied the US economy with an “army of available 
workers”: a mobile workforce that typically arrives with a “vulnerable, second-
class status, at a price that [employers] want to pay.”226 
B. The Zapatistas and Resistance of NAFTA 
“No amount of law-and-order, however, can quell deepening 
unrest in a world demarcated so deeply by wealth and poverty.” 
—Tom Hayden, The Zapatista Reader227  
The Zapatista Army for National Liberation deliberately timed its uprising 
for the day that NAFTA came into effect on January 1, 1994.228 As Mexican 
farming subsidies were made illegal and US products flooded the market, the 
Zapatistas foresaw the consequences that would be felt in Mexico’s southern 
rural regions,229 calling NAFTA a “death sentence” for indigenous 
communities.230 The group started what has been called the first major 
movement to challenge neoliberalism, and it has sustained eighteen years of 
organized opposition, bringing visibility to the fallout of programs like 
NAFTA and to the struggle of indigenous peoples.231 Additionally, the 
Zapatista uprising has sparked a broader mobilization of groups demanding a 
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more inclusive democratic model in Mexico and an end to free-trade economic 
policies.232 
The Zapatista uprising marked an “enormous blow to business and 
government interests,” and it has “since acquired profound symbolic 
significance” for those interested in resisting the free-trade model of global 
integration.233 As such, the rebellion has fueled anxiety about the safety of 
NAFTA investments. One of Mexico’s main goals in signing the agreement 
was to increase its share of foreign direct investment,234 as companies are often 
attracted to Mexico because they can pay residents lower wages.235 Analysts 
cited the Zapatista uprising as one of the main reasons for the devaluation of 
the peso in December 1994 because the uprising caused uncertainty among 
investors.236 The implication here may be that anti-neoliberal movements are 
incompatible with NAFTA.237 
Since bursting onto the political scene, the Zapatistas have been targeted by 
the Mexican government in a “low-intensity” war.238 In 1995, the Mexican 
army invaded Zapatista territory, triggering the displacement of approximately 
10,000 to 20,000 people.239 In the years following, Zapatista communities have 
essentially lived under military and police occupation, with as many as 65,000 
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troops stationed in the conflict zone.240 Paramilitaries often carry out the dirty 
work of the state.241 Zapatista women report experiencing a continuous threat 
of rape and harassment by the military, police, and paramilitaries because of 
their political involvement.242 In 1997, forty-six indigenous women, children, 
and men from the Tzotzil community of Acteal were massacred by 
paramilitaries, this being one of the most brutal examples of the violence.243 
Since the escalation of the war on drugs, the militarization of Mexico has 
heightened, allowing the state to criminalize expressions of social resistance.244 
Although Zapatista territory has experienced significantly less drug-related 
violence than the rest of Mexico, “there has been an increase in state violence 
against those communities under the pretext of looking for narcotics.”245 In the 
climate of “overwhelming violence and impunity” created in the war, the 
“assassinations of political opponents—indigenous rights leaders, human rights 
advocates, anti-mining activists, guerrilla insurgents—are quickly swept into 
the ever rising body count without much attention or outcry.”246  
This dynamic is not lost on the Zapatistas. In May 2011, the group held one 
of their biggest demonstrations to protest Calderón’s violent antidrug 
strategy.247 Over 15,000 supporters joined the group, and they marched in 
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silence calling for an end to the war. They carried thousands of signs bearing 
the messages, “No more blood,” “We’re fed up,” and “Stop Calderón’s 
War.”248 Near the end of a speech, one comandante repeated a message seven 
times, a message intended for all the victims of Calderón’s war and their 
families: “You are not alone.”249 
V. THE USE OF SHOCK: MÉRIDA, NARCO-CORRUPTION, THE 
SECURITY INDUSTRY, AND A NATIONAL CRISIS 
While still negotiating NAFTA, Mexico strove to show that it was cracking 
down on the narcotics industry in order to calm US concerns that opening the 
countries’ shared border to investment and trade would also allow an increased 
flow of illicit substances.250 The New York Times ran a front-page story 
reporting that the drug traffickers intended to use the trade agreement for their 
own benefit as a cover for their operations—Congress demanded assurance 
that the border would be “locked tight from drug runners.”251  
Proponents of NAFTA in both governments helped to “recraft” Mexico’s 
antidrug image.252 Mexico stepped up its drug control efforts while the US 
State Department published positive yearly reviews detailing the number of 
drug seizures made by Mexican authorities, the number of drug-related arrests, 
and the number of poppy and marijuana crops destroyed.253 Once NAFTA was 
passed, however, anxiety about border policing and security has only 
intensified, especially around the two main cross-border flows that NAFTA 
does not regulate: immigration and illicit drugs.254  
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A. Mérida: An Initiative to Armor NAFTA  
The years since NAFTA’s passage have been marked by an escalation in 
joint security initiatives between the two countries.255 In 2005, just over a 
decade into NAFTA, the United States, Canada, and Mexico signed a regional 
defense program called the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP), which 
was widely understood as an effort to expand NAFTA.256 The SPP’s official 
mission aimed to “increase security and to enhance prosperity among the three 
countries through greater cooperation.”257 In a post-9/11 world, it also aimed to 
make the United States’ “war on terror” into a regional security issue.258 
According to Thomas Shannon, US Assistant Secretary of State for Western 
Hemisphere Affairs, the SPP was intended to address any security concerns 
that might be implicated in cross-border economic cooperation.259 The 
underlying mission of the program crystallized when he stated, “[t]o a certain 
extent, we’re armoring NAFTA.”260 
The history of the Mérida Initiative and US funding for Mexico’s war on 
drugs can be traced back to the SPP,261 whose agenda covered 300 different 
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policy arenas,262 including immigration, the environment, and food regulations, 
among others.263 Originally, it was thought that President Bush would unveil 
the details of the Mérida Initiative at a SPP meeting in Montebello, Quebec, in 
August 2007, but the plan’s release was delayed, possibly due to a large 
presence of protesters and high levels of tension between activists and 
police.264 The SPP had come under intense criticism in all three countries.265 A 
broad coalition of labor activists, environmentalists, and human rights 
advocates266 were outraged by the closed-door nature of the talks.267 Five 
hundred protesters converged on the Quebec meeting, and police resorted to 
tear gas and pepper spray during confrontations.268 In 2009, the SPP was 
declared inactive, for reasons that are not entirely clear.269  
The Mérida Initiative, on the other hand, was formally announced in 
October 2007.270 The $1.4 billion aid package was discussed at SPP meetings, 
and the US State Department has made it clear that there is a link between the 
SPP and the Initiative.271 Although the militarization of Mexico’s drug war is 
narrower in its agenda than the SPP and, in the end, more politically 
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sustainable, its impact on civil society in Mexico has been no less than 
devastating. 
B. Narco-Corruption as a Reflection of Corporatism 
“When activities thought of as corrupt become so prevalent in a 
government that it is impossible to speak of an institution free of 
them, when corruption ceases to be an aberration and becomes an 
integral part of the system, it is then no longer accurate to speak of 
corruption as such.”  
 —John Gibler, Mexico Unconquered272 
Eduardo Valle, former advisor to the Mexican attorney general, stated in 
1995 that the drug industry had become “driving forces, pillars even, of our 
economic growth.”273 The US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
estimates that the illicit drug industry has earned Mexico between $30 billion 
and $50 billion in profit annually for the last twenty years.274 The industry is 
often said to be second only to oil in its earning capacity for Mexico; its profits 
may exceed the oil industry, but no official numbers exist to compare the 
two.275 
The rise of corporatism in the United States has developed slowly over time; 
eventually, the “so-called revolving door” that characterized relationships 
between government and business was replaced by an “archway”; in the 
context of disaster response, entire industries have “set up shop inside the 
government.”276 The revolving door between cartels and the Mexican state, in 
the context of drug trafficking, became an archway in the 1990s, when direct 
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274 EL SICARIO, supra note 26, at 10. See Mexican Drug Gangs ‘Spread to Every Region of 
US’, BBC NEWS (Mar. 10, 2010 8:38), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8588509.stm 
(reporting that an estimated $40 billion is moved back into Mexico from the United States 
each year from illicit drug sales). 
275 See EL SICARIO, supra note 26, at 10. 
276 KLEIN, supra note 2, at 316. 
A War on Civilians 967 
VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 2 • 2012 
participation by Mexican government actors in the drug business accelerated 
substantially.277  
Drug cartels function like other businesses in certain aspects of their 
structure and in their need for some level of cooperation from the state in order 
to prosper. The common workers in the drug trade, the sellers and smugglers, 
are largely made up of individuals with few socio-economic opportunities, 
who, upon entering the drug business, deal with an “unpredictable career that 
often leads to prison, death, or ruin.”278 Trafficking organizations are at least 
partially hierarchical structures,279 and, similar to other capitalist businesses, 
the lowest members make relatively little profit while the upper echelons may 
accumulate startling levels of wealth.280 
In order to maintain control of transportation routes, cartels require a certain 
amount of cooperation from the police, military, and government officials.281 
The most powerful cartel in a given area receives law enforcement 
protection.282 In some respects, local government and law enforcement may 
not have a lot of choice in deciding whether to cooperate with drug traffickers. 
From January to October 2010, eleven municipal mayors were killed in 
Mexico—more than one death of an elected official per month.283 The killings 
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are assumed to have been committed by criminal organizations to intimidate 
the government.284 They likely occurred either because the local governments 
began refusing to facilitate cartel activities or because the governments began 
to impede the activities of the cartels. Either way, the deaths imply that cartels 
need the government to cooperate in order to do their business, and that they 
are prepared to obtain that cooperation through any means necessary.285  
El Sicario, an anonymous ex-employee of the drug business, maintains that 
all of the law enforcement academies in Mexico have been used as training 
grounds by the cartels.286 Students learn how to handle weapons, recognize 
faces, pursue people in an urban chase without losing them, and conduct 
surveillance, all of which are of use to the cartels.287 El Sicario recounts his 
own story of working for the cartels from the time he began training with the 
police, explaining that fifty of the two hundred students he graduated with 
were already on the payroll of a drug trafficking organization.288 
The “explosion of violence” in recent years has not slowed the drug trade. In 
fact, El Sicario suggests that “the atmosphere of unrestrained violence acts as a 
smokescreen for the real business and that the money flow is now better than 
ever.”289 Additionally, workers economically displaced in the wake of NAFTA 
have begun growing illicit drugs, supplying the cartels with merchandise. As a 
result of the free-trade agreement, “[b]y 2007 a kilo of illicit drugs could get a 
price 300 times higher than a kilo of maize; a kilo of marijuana or poppies was 
worth more than a ton of beans.”290 The number of hectares dedicated to 
growing poppies eventually outnumbered those which are dedicated to 
growing maize.291 By all accounts, the cartels have not suffered in the midst of 
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NAFTA and the militarization of Mexico’s war on drugs, nor has the presence 
of narco-corruption diminished.   
C. A Privatized War in which the Weapons Industry Fuels Both Sides 
The merging of corporate, political, and financial interests in the arena of 
national security is reflected in US aid to Mexico for the drug war;292 in 
particular, private profits are generated in the US weapons industry, which 
supplies arms to both the traffickers and the Mexican state.  
The US arms industry benefits from supplying the traffickers. Organized 
crime organizations and their members need access to high-power weapons 
like “missiles launchers, machine guns, and grenades.”293 Because Mexico has 
stricter gun laws than the United States, “American guns are pouring over the 
border.”294 Today, there are about 15 million illegal firearms in Mexico, 90 
percent of which likely came from the United States.295 As a result, Calderón 
complains that his government is “outgunned”296 by the cartels’ access to US 
weapons and justifies his militarized approach to antidrug policy on this basis. 
On the other side of the drug war, Mexican law enforcement received 
$132.5 million, which funded security and surveillance equipment as well as 
training.297 Most of these funds went to the Federal Police Force, with the rest 
to Customs, Immigration, and Communications.298 
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US defense corporations receive contracts to supply arms to the Mexican 
government through this funding. Over 40 percent of the Mérida Initiative’s 
money goes to defense companies; the funding was used to purchase eight Bell 
helicopters, which cost $13 million each, for the Mexican Army and two 
CASA 235 maritime patrol planes, which cost $50 million each, for the 
Mexican Navy.299 Bell Helicopter is owned by another company named 
Textron.300 Textron, a publically traded company, is governed by a board that 
includes Kathleen M. Bader, who sat on President Bush’s Homeland Security 
Advisory Council for seven years and was a director of Halliburton, the 
company that received many of the contracts to rebuild Iraq.301  
The Mérida Initiative’s emphasis on weapons and security “structurally 
revamps the basis of the binational relationship in ways meant to permanently 
emphasize military aspects over much-needed development aid and 
modifications in trade and investment policy.”302 The direct presence of the US 
military in Mexico’s territory would be illegal, and it would also provoke a 
strong nationalist reaction from Mexico.303 Instead, the Mérida Initiative 
allows the United States to fund, train, and equip Mexican law enforcement in 
way that supports US corporate security interests  and simultaneously “armors” 
NAFTA by militarizing civil society. Because of the high levels of narco-
corruption and human rights violations committed by state security forces, it is 
also increasingly a source of brutal and systemic state-sanctioned violence. 
D. Reality on the Ground: Collective Trauma and a National Crisis 
“[W]hat is increasingly clear is that if this is a war, 
it is being waged, at least in part, by powerful 
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forces of the Mexican government against 
poor and marginalized sectors of the Mexican people.” 
—El Sicario (The Assassin)304 
 
“They took a cloth . . . and they wrapped it around my head except 
for my nose . . . later I learned that this was what they called “the 
mummy” . . . They left me like this and began to do the thing with the 
water again, but this time the water came in directly through my nose. 
They repeated this three times. That’s when I said, ‘That’s it, I’ll 
confess to whatever you want.’” 
—Marcelo Laguarda Dávila, Monterrey, Nuevo León305 
“We have a national emergency here,” said Mexican poet and novelist Javier 
Sicilia, whose 24-year-old son was gunned down in the drug violence in 
2011.306 The concepts of shock and psychological and physical trauma as 
analyzed in Klein’s work307 becomes particularly salient in examining the on-
the-ground reality of the drug war. In real terms, the war on drugs has directly 
increased human rights abuses and has escalated the drug war to the point of 
generating a collective crisis within Mexican society.308 
In November 2011, Human Rights Watch published a 212-page report 
documenting what many in Mexico were already acutely aware of: the abuses 
committed by the Mexican authorities since the militarization of 
counternarcotics operations in 2006. The report provides a damning account of 
the widespread use of illegal detentions, kidnappings, forced disappearances, 
and extrajudicial killings.309 These abuses represent a systemic problem—that 
is, they are not isolated incidents or aberrations.310 Moreover, in Mexico, there 
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is virtually no investigation into the abuses, meaning that law enforcement and 
drug cartels commit them with overwhelming impunity.311 
Human Rights Watch documented 170 cases of torture committed by all 
levels of security forces involved in antidrug efforts: the Army; Navy; Federal 
Police; and state, local, and judicial investigative police.312 Most victims were 
arrested under the pretext of committing a crime, held for hours or days, 
prevented from contacting family or loved ones, and tortured for information 
about organized crime or for a confession regarding involvement in organized 
crime.313 One woman in Tijuana reported being raped and tortured while in 
custody. Officials then brought out pictures of her children and partner, 
threatening to target them if she did not maintain her false confession.314 An 
indigenous woman in the state of Guerrero described how plainclothes police 
entered and searched her home. They interrogated her and her four sons about 
a man whose name she was unfamiliar with, and then beat them with rifles. 
She and one of her sons were forced into vehicles, then punched and kicked 
repeatedly on the way to the police station. The officers threatened to kill her 
son if he did not offer them information about a woman who had 
disappeared.315 Evidence has surfaced that the United States has engaged in 
training the Mexican police in torture techniques as part of the Mérida 
Initiative, likely through private contractors.316 In one video, “the contractor 
drags an officer through his own vomit;” another shows “a victim given shots 
of water up his nose.”317 
Arbitrary detention and forced disappearances have also become 
widespread; detentions are never officially registered, and security forces often 
deny having the victim in custody when their family comes searching for 
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them.318 Military officials acknowledge that nearly 20,000 civilians have 
disappeared between 2007 and 2010.319  For example, in June 2011, a 22-year-
old taxi driver in the state of Nuevo León was stopped at a Navy checkpoint, 
removed from his taxi, and put into a Navy pick-up truck.320 His father, also a 
taxi driver, was there, and asked the officials why his son was being 
detained.321 He was told that if his son was “not involved in anything,” he 
would be brought back.322 Five months later, his family filed complaints with 
both the state and federal prosecutor’s offices, but they still have no 
information about their son.323 Instead of pursuing such complaints, 
government officials have a practice of preemptively classifying the incidents 
as levantones, referring to kidnappings carried out by an organized crime 
group.324 
The cartels also use torture to force confessions, and they regularly 
disappear people. In October 2010, a lawyer was kidnapped from his desk at 
his office.325 He soon appeared in a series of internet videos sitting handcuffed, 
surrounded by men wearing black ski masks.326 With guns pointing at his head 
and body, he recounted on camera his involvement with the Juárez Cartel, 
stating that he and his sister, the former state attorney general, both worked for 
the cartel and had organized political murders from their positions.327 His sister 
says that his kidnappers tortured him as revenge against her for firing 350 
police and prosecutors for corruption.328 A few days later, his body turned up, 
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half-buried, in a rural area.329 According to El Sicario, there are several 
“clandestine cemeteries” around Ciudad Juárez and the rest of the country, 
some of them mass graves where the cartels bury their victims.330 Also in 
October 2010, gunmen fired on three buses carrying workers coming home 
from work at a manufacturing plant, leaving four dead and fourteen injured.331 
Another shootout at a birthday party left fourteen youth dead.332 The local 
police said the goal of these murders was to destabilize the government and 
law enforcement, implying that they were committed by criminal 
organizations.333 
Even when the Mexican authorities target their antidrug efforts at a cartel 
member or leader (as opposed to innocent victims, as described above), these 
encounters often end in brutal and public displays of violence, spreading terror 
among the general population.334 In December 2009, at least two hundred 
Mexican troops, acting on intelligence from the United States, stormed an 
upscale apartment complex in the city of Cuernavaca and killed drug lord 
Arturo Beltrán Leyva335 along with other cartel members.336 The highest-level 
assassination of a cartel leader yet in the drug war, the killing was lauded as “a 
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convincing blow” to the cartels337 and a “rare success for Mexican and US 
intelligence officials.”338  
The execution had other consequences on the ground, however. Residents of 
the apartment complex witnessed a violent military assault—they were 
evacuated and held at a gymnasium in the complex while helicopters circled 
low, grenades exploded, and machine guns were fired.339 The shootout was 
vicious, lasting between one and two hours, and residents were left to clean up 
the bloodstains.340 Afterwards, Cuernavaca was left wondering if the death 
would lead to more violence, with cartel members battling to replace the boss, 
or if the death would prompt a rival cartel to attack.341 A Wikileaks cable 
reveals that the Mexican authorities conceded that “[a] spike [in violence] is 
probably likely in the short term as inter- and intra-cartel battles are intensified 
by the sudden leadership gap in one of the country’s most important cartels.”342 
Fulfilling this prediction, in August 2010, four decapitated bodies were found 
hanging by their ankles from a major bridge in Cuernavaca.343 Their heads 
were found next to the highway along with a handwritten sign indicating that 
anyone supporting a particular person in taking control of the cartel, which had 
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been without a leader since Beltrán Leyva’s murder, would suffer the same 
fate.344 
In some ways, the Mexican authorities sent a similarly militant message in 
killing Leyva: those who it confronts in the course of the drug war will be met 
with violence—no formal charges will be made, no due process of law will be 
awarded. The pattern of terrifying violence—torture, disappearances, and 
extrajudicial killings—committed directly by the state, and documented by 
Human Rights Watch, reflects nothing less than the imposition of mass trauma 
by the state on its populace. Under Pinochet’s notoriously brutal regime, over 
3,000 people were killed or disappeared and at least 80,000 were 
imprisoned.345 In Mexico, 47,000 people have died, and the war still continues.  
Analyzing the shock doctrine in the Chilean context, discussed earlier, 
reveals parallels between the economic shocks implemented under Pinochet 
and the physical shocks of torture and terror administered by his regime. In 
Mexico, these same parallels can be identified. The militarization of Mexico’s 
antinarcotics policies through the Mérida Initiative grew out of the SPP 
discussions, which represented an effort to “armor NAFTA.”346 The 
militarization of Mexico under the pretext of the war on drugs reflects the 
heightened security concerns that have surfaced in the context of increased 
transnational trade and investment. These connections suggest that the 
economic shock of neoliberal restructuring under NAFTA and the 
physiological shock and collective trauma of widespread violence and 
militarization since Calderón’s war began are related. 
Just as Pinochet once faced charges in international courts for the abuses 
committed by his regime,347 Mexican activists and human rights lawyer Netzai 
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Sandoval filed a complaint in November 2011 with the International Criminal 
Court in The Hague, alleging the commission of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity by both Mexican security forces and drug cartel leaders.348 While 
this type of legal advocacy is invaluable, examining Mexico’s war on drugs 
through the lens of the shock doctrine suggests that the broader framework of 
neoliberalism and the context of socioeconomic disparities should also be 
challenged, as the connections between these ostensibly separate spheres—
economic policy and political terror—become clearer.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
“We’re here to tell ourselves and them that we will not turn this 
pain in our souls, in our bodies, in[to] hate nor in[to] more 
violence, but in[to] a vehicle to help us restore love, peace, 
justice, dignity and the stuttering democracy that we’re losing, 
[…] that we still believe that it’s possible to rescue and 
reconstruct the social fabric of our peoples, neighborhoods and 
cities.” 
 —Javier Sicilia, speaking in Mexico City, May 2011349  
 
In May 2011, more than 100,000 people, led by Sicilia after his son was 
killed by gunmen, marched from Cuernavaca to Mexico City, demanding an 
end to the war on drugs in Mexico.350 These mobilization efforts are part of 
breaking the silence around US-led antidrug laws and policies, and it is time 
for our domestic legal and socio-political discourses to follow suit. “[O]nce the 
mechanics of the shock doctrine are deeply and collectively understood,” Klein 
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writes, entire communities become “shock resistant.”351 Ultimately, this article 
aims to demonstrate the need to develop a deeper understanding of the war on 
drugs and, by extension, the need for broad demands in order to advance 
meaningful social change. 
In sum, I suggest here that the political logic of Mexico’s war on drugs is a 
product of neoliberalism—the grueling socio-economic stratification created 
and enforced through austerity measures, deregulation, privatization, and free-
trade agreements—and the militarized control that represses dissent in the face 
of deepening disparities. In order to effect change, our critique must move 
beyond the parameters of the US and Mexican government’s stated antidrug 
policy objectives. Criticizing the war on drugs for its failure to eradicate drug 
trafficking352 fails to account for the socio-economic and political contexts 
within which this program was developed and legitimated.  
In writing about the human rights violations committed by Pinochet’s 
government, Orlando Latelier, wrote that the “system of institutionalized 
brutality, the drastic control and suppression of every form of meaningful 
dissent is discussed (and often condemned) as a phenomenon only indirectly 
linked, or indeed entirely unrelated, to the classical unrestrained ‘free market’ 
policies that have been enforced by the military junta.353 The “entirely 
unrelated” ideology cleans the economic regime of its crimes—while the 
torture and human rights abuses are condemned, the economic free-market 
policies are applauded,354 operating on the presumption that the two constitute 
separate dynamics. This article represents a call for the need to depart from the 
“entirely unrelated” ideology.  
The war on drugs in Mexico is not solely about human rights violations, nor 
is it just about narco-corruption or the arms trade. Instead, militarization allows 
                                                 
351 KLEIN, supra note 2, at 459. 
352 See, e.g., Global War on Drugs ‘Has Failed’ Say Former Leaders, BBC NEWS (June 
2, 2011, 4:30 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13624303. 
353 KLEIN, supra note 2, at 117. Latelier was a former member of the Allende administration 
and was arrested and tortured by Pinochet. Id.  
354 Id. at 117–18. 
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the Mexican authorities to target groups that are working to develop 
alternatives to the predominant socio-economic channels under the pretext of 
antidrug actions. The profound levels of violence and the climate of fear 
produced by the war on drugs in Mexico act as mechanisms that thwart the 
democratic participation of civil society. The human rights abuses and 
widespread state-sanctioned violence committed via the war on drugs in 
Mexico can be seen as an effective and profitable method (for some) of 
protecting US-led neoliberalism.  
 The urgency of the situation points to the need for building an analysis that 
understands and challenges the complexities of neoliberalism, government 
antidrug policy, immigration enforcement, and state-sanctioned violence. 
Social Justice movements must continue seeking alternatives to free-market 
economic policies and neoliberal narratives and to demand an end to all forms 
of state-sanctioned violence—these arenas form part of our resistance to the 
war on drugs, both in the United States and in Mexico. An inquiry into the war 
on drugs that is devoid of a critique on these related matters risks “sacrific[ing] 
the broad goals that might connect a new social movement strong and 
ambitious enough to take on inequalities that single-issue politics only ever 
ameliorate, but never reverse.”355  
 
                                                 
355 DUGGAN, supra note 13, at xx.  
